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SUMMARY  
The European Union’s integration activity 
and style of governance in relation to the 
public policy of member-states have un-
dergone a strong learning process over 
the last 15 years. Legal means have been 
coupled with open methods of coordina-
tion, so that compulsory change is joined 
by incentives based on exchanging ex-
perience. With the spread of the Euro-
pean pattern of environmental protection, 
the EU has learnt much from earlier 
enlargements, adding to legal harmoniza-
tion allocation of substantial resources to 
developing its capacity to enforce the ac-
quis communautaire in acceding coun-
tries. 
The effects of the adaptation proc-
ess have been uneven in every dimension 
of public policy. While waste-management 
tools, especially legal tools, have fallen 
wholly into line with EU patterns, de-
clared objectives in many cases pay only 
lip service to the objectives advanced by 
the EU. This means that governance has 
been guided by infrastructural and mate-
rial conditions and by governmental tra-
ditions more strongly than by declared 
objectives. Over the last 15 years, the 
government’s environmental institution 
building has taken a course it would 
probably have followed in a similar way 
if Hungary had not integrated into 
Europe. An exception is precisely the in-
stitutional behaviour patterns concerning 
multi-level governance: efforts to mobilize 
a wide range of tools for harmonizing 
interests of various levels of government, 
economic sectors and civil society. These 
have largely developed in reaction to EU 
regulations and financing conditions.  
However, this has proved too little 
to help Hungary’s infant environmental 
policy keep pace with the clear develop-
ment of tools. Among the reasons for the 
government’s uneven performance, there 
are numerous factors pointing to inade-
quacies in the style of governance: super-
ficial imitation of EU patterns, unfortu-
nate choices of centralization patterns, 
lack of accord between ministries, party 
political influence over professional mat-
ters, and ambiguous relations with the 
civil sector. 
Hungary’s waste-management policy 
has certainly undergone radical reforms 
in the last decade, in no small measure 
through adaptation to EU integration. The 
driving forces have been adaptation to 
EU legal patterns, enforcement institu-
tions, financing frameworks and planning 
activity. These and the coming of a 
waste-management market have spread 
EU patterns to Hungary’s institutions and 
their networks.  
Yet the positive impacts have ap-
peared in environmental protection only 
to a limited extent. Standards of waste 
management in Hungary lags well behind 
the EU norm. There are numerous causes 
of this: cost of running existing outdated 
waste-management infrastructures, high 
costs of modernizing them, legal difficul-
ties with creating a new type of coopera-
tion network, institutional incompetence, 
misinterpretation of local-government 
powers, supposed and real distortions of 
competition observed in the waste-
management market, and lack of social 
capital. 
Hungarian waste management policy 
is centralized, but it cannot be regarded 
as purely a top-down managed activity, 
as it includes continuous relaying and 
representation of the interests of micro-
level actors. The multiple levels seen as 
an EU requirement are spreading in the 
style of governance of waste management 
policy, but at the same time, familiar, 
habitual patterns of centralization are re-
establishing themselves.  
  
Style of governance can be consid-
ered open once the involvement of busi-
nesses, economic interest groups and civil 
organizations have become routine. The 
Hungarian Waste Management Act of 
2000 gave the government regulatory 
responsibility for all types of waste. The 
regional organs of environmental gov-
ernment operate under strictly imposed 
central criteria. However, for the coun-
try’s environmental deficit to be elimi-
nated and for Hungary to grow into the 
tasks of enforcing the regulations that 
follow from legal harmonization will call 
for measures in organizational develop-
ment and much greater resources that 
are allocated at present. The LGOs have 
the tasks of following the regulations and 
imposing them on others. In fact, they 
are underfunded, and confine themselves 
either to implementing waste-management 
decisions or postponing them. The gov-
ernment cooperates closely in planning 
with LGOs, businesses and civil groups.  
Europeanization of public policy has 
fundamentally changed the motivational 
mechanism and scope of action for all 
waste-management actors and others af-
fected by the policy area. Local conflicts, 
court cases and referenda relating to 
waste management often involve party-
political interests and NIMBY (not-in-my-
backyard) position. Elsewhere, however, 
as waste depositing became profitable for 
public and privately owned landfills, a 
PIMBY (put-in-my-backyard) stance also 
became widespread. These considerations 
also influence decisions on creating sub-
regional associations operating with EU 
co-financing.  
The network of relations among 
governmental, private and civil organiza-
tions in waste management in the Central 
Hungary region, chosen for the case 
study, does not show uniform density. 
While influential institutional actors have 
a central position, others have only be-
come embedded in the web of market 
and bureaucratic relations to a lesser 
extent. Characteristically, the core of 
government, local government and pri-
vate organizations at the centre of the 
web have a rich network extending over 
a wide range of ownership, regulation 
and customer relations. The networks of 
small LGOs and waste-management firms 
on the periphery, on the other hand, are 
mainly determined by their position on 
the supply or demand side of the market 
in waste-management services. Although 
some communities in the region have be-
come significant receivers of waste from 
Budapest, no distinct trace of this can be 
found in the development of the network 
of institutions. The total impact of civil 
organizations is modest, but their rela-
tions are rich; they cooperate regularly 





The paper reports on a survey taken 
under the international EU–5 research 
programme, based on structured inter-
views made at 32 institutional actors to 
do with waste management in the Cen-
tral Hungary region, including public 
institutions, private or mixed firms, and 
civil (voluntary) organizations. The inter-
views sought to chart qualitative and 
quantitative features of existing policy in 
the field and shed light on the style of 
multi-level governance during the Euro-
peanization process, in relation to adapt-
ing Hungarian environmental policy. The 
research focused on the relations of each 
interviewee’s organization with other or-
ganizations and institutions, the appear-
ance of EU integration mechanisms in 
and around it, and the processes of ad-
aptation and learning undergone. After 
presenting some concepts of political sci-
ence and EU precedents, the authors de-
scribe interactive patterns and networks 
between the local public institutional 
structures, the private sector and civil 
organizations in the context of European 
integration, especially in legal harmoniza-
tion and under the ISPA programme. 
They identify the region’s main actors 
and problems in waste management, re-
view cooperation and conflict between 
regional and local actors, and chart di-
rect and indirect connections with the 
integration process. 
                                                 
* The study by Péter Futó of the Corvinus Univer-
sity, Budapest and Tamás Fleischer of the Institute 
for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences, Budapest, was made under the EU–5 
research programme ‘EU enlargement and multi-
level governance in European regional and envi-
ronmental policies: patterns of institutional learn-
ing, adaptation and Europeanization among cohe-
sion countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) and 
lessons for new members (Hungary and Poland)’ 
(ADAPT). International team coordinators: Christos 
Paraskevopoulos and Panayotis Getimis (Greece). 
INTEGRATION AND 
EUROPEANIZATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY 
 
Conceptual frameworks  
Europeanization is viewed by political sci-
entists as a gradual transformation that 
gives new direction and form to national 
policy and policy-making by making EU 
policy and economic dynamics part of 
organizational logic. Most researchers 
into this (Bache 2003) view the Europe-
anization process through the cause-and-
effect paradigm, as a succession of con-
sequences in member-states, with EU in-
tegration policy as the cause and mo-
mentum. But member-states are not just 
passive recipients of pressure from the 
EU, as they in turn convey to the EU 
their national preferences. Researchers 
who believe the EU itself to be a product 
of Europeanization are a minority (Wal-
lace 2000). Most hold that the adapta-
tion process of member-states results 
from compulsion or pressure to adapt, 
in a process whose depth and dynamics 
of change depend on: 
* the extent to which there are organi-
zations and supporting institutions with 
the right of veto present in the mem-
ber-state in question,  
* what sort of organizational and policy 
making culture the country has, and 
* the extent of the influence and learn-
ing ability of the actors.  
The target groups of Europeaniza-
tion are individuals, households, busi-
nesses and institutions – public, private 
and civil actors. Adaptation is not simply 
realized on an institutional level. Due to 
this process, acceptance of European val-
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ues and policy paradigms changes the 
identity of the actors and the dialogue 
between them. The impact varies from 
country to country and according to pol-
icy area and type of actor and institu-
tion. A concept often mentioned in paral-
lel with enlargement is deepening, by 
which is usually meant the extent to 
which integration penetrates the member-
country.  
Research into Europeanization has 
increasingly been emphasizing bottom-up 
and horizontal pressure, the values and 
interests of actors, enforcement of regu-
lations combined with voluntary learning, 
the identity of the actors, the diversity of 
the impacts, and the dynamics and re-
sults of the process (Bache 2003).  
It is intriguing to ask what attrib-
utes and characteristics of nation-states’ 
public policies change under the pressure 
to Europeanize. Recent analyses (such as 
Liefferink and Jordan 2002) usually de-
fine public policy attributes in terms of: 
* policy content – the paradigms and 
active objectives of the policy as well 
as the tools and how they are cali-
brated, 
* institutional structures, and 
* prevailing style of interaction.  
The EU primarily seeks to integrate 
the content of public policies, but con-
vergence mechanisms can also affect the 
structure and style of a policy. In Hun-
gary, for instance, the stated objectives 
of environmental policy are in unison 
with the EU’s objectives, and its tools, 
especially the system of legal provisions, 
can be considered as partly European-
ized. Nevertheless, the nature and state 
of development of institutions and the 
style of interactions between actors pre-
serve earlier traditions of government 
and adapt very slowly to Western Euro-
pean patterns and standards. 
Convergence 
Describing Europeanization would be 
simple if it could be explained by the 
metaphor of convergence, but many be-
lieve that applying convergence theory 
yields superficial results insufficiently re-
fined to depict the complex Europeaniza-
tion patterns in each public-policy area 
in member-states. Authors (e.g. Liefferink 
and Jordan 2002; Bennett 1991) distin-
guish four types of convergence mecha-
nism for Europeanizing public policies:  
* imitation founded on foreign experi-
ences, 
* impact through the network of elites, 
based on common understanding and 
learning,  
* harmonization, an internationally ac-
cepted process based on mutual de-
pendence and autonomy of nation-
states, and 
* penetration, based on external compul-
sion and pressure. 
Hungarian experience suggests that 
the harmonization mechanism based on 
international agreements prevails in Euro-
peanization of public policies. The 
mechanisms of imitation and elite-network 
learning have a role mainly in preparing 
the more significant institutional reforms. 
Only Euro-sceptic researchers (Böröcz 
2001) argue that the penetration mecha-
nism has a significant role in Europeani-
zation in Hungary. 
The ‘governance’ approach stresses 
the significance of interaction between 
actors and of bargaining networks in 
policy-making, as opposed to the tradi-
tional ‘government’ approach. Dictionaries 
define both as ‘governing, the action or 
manner of controlling or regulating’. But 
in recent political literature, the popular-
ity of the phrase ‘good governance’ im-
plicitly contrasts with traditional ‘top-
down’ governing methods centred on 
rigid interpretation of centrally devised 
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concepts and continual appraisal of 
lower levels of government and actors. 
The ‘governance’ approach adds accented 
new elements, implying that public and 
private-sector and civil-society actors are 
becoming increasingly active in the policy 
process, although more activity by non-
governmental actors does not necessarily 
bring diffusion of power (Ahonen 2003; 
Bache 2003). 
Multi-level governance 
This is another concept to which political 
scientists (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2001) 
devote increasing attention. It expresses 
how an increasing number of powers are 
transferred from the central state appa-
ratus to superordinate international or 
subordinate and coordinate domestic or-
ganizations. There is still no agreement 
on a practical model for this. When ana-
lysing multi-level governance, attention 
needs paying not only to transfers of 
powers (competences) in various direc-
tions, but to the right of institutions to 
levy and dispose of taxes, and to decen-
tralization of formal and informal rela-
tions in the exercise of power. One of 
the main dimensions in the division of 
power is realizable through regional lev-
els, while the division of power through 
forms of ownership, legal formulae and 
economic sectors tinge and interweave 
with the basic texture.  
The current degree of multi-level 
governance in the EU is apparent in the 
ability of the regions to establish direct 
relations with central EU bodies as inter-
national organizations, bypassing central 
government. The decision-making compe-
tence of central governments in environ-
mental protection is also restricted by 
international agreements, regional compe-
tencies and powers delegated to NGOs. 
Open methods of coordination 
This covers a sheaf of governance meth-
ods that help to bridge coordination dif-
ficulties accompanying the introduction of 
multi-level governance. In EU practice, 
the means of command and persuasion 
are fused in a peculiar manner during 
harmonization of the various public poli-
cies of member-states. On the one hand, 
common objectives and principles and 
quantitative and qualitative objectives for 
member-states are prescribed. On the 
other – depending on the policy area – 
cooperation, exchange of best practice, 
devising of action plans for member-
states, monitoring of progress at regular 
intervals, and comparison of member-
states’ efforts are encouraged rather than 
prescribed.  
Networks 
It is widely accepted that competitiveness 
of regions and their success in planning 
and implementing public policies are de-
termined less by the good qualities of 
individual institutions and businesses than 
by the richness of their relations – the 
viability and harmony of the networks 
created by institutional actors. Exponents 
of sociology, especially institutional sociol-
ogy over the last decade have also sub-
scribed to the idea of researching the 
significance of networks in diverse disci-
plines of natural and social science 
(Barabási 2002; Paraskevopoulos 2001). 
Researching the relations density, cen-
tralization and structure of networks 
created by public service, business and 
civil actors fits in well with the produc-
tive sociological paradigm of social-
network analysis (SNA) developed in the 
last decade. Quantitative analysis of per-
sonal and institutional networks appears 
as a still more widespread method when 
examining economic cooperation, policy 
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impact and dissemination of innovation 
(Letenyei 2000).  
Network building has become a 
tried and tested adaptation strategy in 
most organizations during Europeaniza-
tion. Enriching the structure of social 
and institutional networks created by 
community actors allows information flow 
and breeds confidence, so reducing the 
costs of market transactions, promoting 
exchange, and increasing the possibilities 
of cooperation in the risky process of 
Europeanization and innovation. Network 
building also has positive economic con-
sequences and facilitates local and re-
gional development. In particular, local 
development policies can be elaborated 
and implemented more effectively in close 
cooperation between the public sector 
and private actors. On the other hand, 
closely knit networks can be detrimental 
if they become means of avoiding compe-
tition or reducing individual autonomy, 
so that they discourage a spirit of enter-
prise and thereby erode efficiency. In ex-
treme cases, excessively strong networks 
may lead to protectionism, development 
of a political client system, or even cor-
ruption and economic crime. However, 
most researchers agree that measures are 
needed to promote and develop coopera-
tive networks between institutional actors, 
through legal, organization developmental 
and financial support (Triglia 2001). 
Social-network analysis (SNA) 
Apart from the verbal, descriptive ap-
proaches applied in many network-
analysis contexts, there have also ap-
peared quantitative methods based on 
exact empirical data. SNA examines how 
actors are embedded in a system of rela-
tions and assess the characteristics of 
that network on a mathematical basis, 
with computer support (Scott 1991). 
Social capital 
Social capital as a feature or resource of 
a community is a concept increasingly 
applied in explaining the variability of 
success in Europeanization processes. The 
term expresses in an integrated manner 
the common values and commitments of 
the actors, along with their positive tradi-
tions and ability to cooperate, whose ex-
tent depends on the ability of the local 
institutional system to adapt and learn. 
International organizations acknowledge 
that the general feeling of wellbeing in 
society and the growth of the economy 
depend closely on factors that comprise 
social capital (OECD 2001; Raiser et al. 
2001). 
EU emphasis on open methods           
of governance 
The EU White Paper issued on methods 
of European governance (European Gov-
ernance – a White Paper 2001) ad-
dressed both the central administration of 
the EU and its current and acceding 
member-states, along with their regions, 
towns and civil societies. The aim is to 
increase openness, flexibility and ac-
countability in the policy process and im-
prove the quality and efficiency of regu-
lation. The White Paper 
* criticizes the slowness and inflexibility 
with which the acquis is being inte-
grated into the legal systems of mem-
ber-states,  
* emphasizes that social networks (rela-
tions of businesses, local government, 
research centres and communities) can 
effectively improve EU policies, 
* notes the broad involvement of experts 
and preparation of risk analyses and 
impact assessments related to the ac-
quis and its applications, which can 
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improve the quality and efficiency of 
regulation, and increase its transpar-
ency, 
* promotes involvement of civil society – 
churches, trade unions, employers’ or-
ganizations – in interest conciliation 
and decision-making on a more inten-
sive level, and 
* lays down that the culture of dialogue 
needs strengthening and thus accepts 
a code of conduct of consultation in 
the law-making and policy process. 
Accepting and harmonizing legisla-
tion, the White Paper argues, is just one 
element of spreading European solutions. 
In addition, there are other non-binding 
tools – proposals, guidelines on applica-
tion and framework agreements enabling 
autonomously devised solutions – that 
should be given a role. 
The document mentions when and 
how the Community can apply so-called 
Open Methods of Coordination (OMCs). 
In projects that can be typified by 
OMCs, vertical and horizontal coordina-
tion is combined with the experimentation 
of nation-states, EU-level monitoring and 
the publicizing of successful solutions. 
The aim is to create a framework for 
policy learning by applying guidelines set 
by central organs, standards, and 
benchmarking techniques. OMCs are a 
promising means of identifying and moni-
toring common objectives because they 
clearly acknowledge national diversity 
and transform the EU into a natural 
laboratory for policy experimentation. 
Their use allows multi-level governance 
of federal systems to be improved. At the 
same time, they make new demands for 
development of decentralized and vertical 
coordination, and necessitate new institu-
tional designs.  
OMCs are intended to complement, 
not replace traditional legislative and im-
plementation processes. They are to be 
used primarily where EU treaties can 
only be applied in a limited manner, 
where consensus is lacking for binding 
directives, and in policy areas too com-
plex to be well harmonized on a Euro-
pean level (Overdevest 2002; Zeitlin 
2002). Since their appearance in 2000, 
OMCs have had success in European pol-
icy-making. In close-to-life experiments, 
they have proved suitable for identifying 
what works well in solving public policy 
problems and what does not. The proto-
types for OMCs consist of the entry re-
quirements for the single market and the 
European Monetary Union, as well as 
implementation of the European Employ-
ment Strategy (EES). The White Paper 
attaches priority not only to legal steps 
against infringing Community law, but to 
reviewing areas in the corpus of law 
that are difficult to apply. It proposes 
analysing why this should be so, monitor-
ing the coherence of national and Com-
munity law, and through institutional co-
operation, developing the optimal tools 
for legal enforcement. 
Open methods had been present in 
EU governance earlier, so that the White 
Paper merely shifted the emphasis to 
some extent. EU policies that lacked le-
gally binding tools, such as SME devel-
opment policy, had always made vigorous 
use of open means – recommendations, 
intergovernmental exchange of experi-
ences during benchmarking and twinning 
projects, and so-called ‘processes’ formu-
lating actual objectives, which bore the 
names of cities staging the initiating con-
ferences (Futó 1999). 
The White Paper caused lively de-
bate. Critics warned that emphasizing the 
rights of interest groups could ‘overload’ 
the processes of EU democracy (Green-
wood 2002). Today there are over 1400 
registered interest groups and almost 
20,000 interest representatives involved in 
shaping EU policy. Critics believe it is 
time to examine and accredit interest 
groups and make dialogue between regu-
lated and regulators more organized, to 
avoid diluting the interest-reconciliation 
process. Critics also condemn excessive 
censure of laggard countries in projects 
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and studies to map best practices (De la 
Porte 2001). 
A diplomatic learning process 
Major changes have occurred in EU en-
vironmental-protection diplomacy since 
Spain’s accession in 1986 (Christiansen 
and Tangen 2001). During Spain’s acces-
sion negotiations, the EU insisted only 
that Spain should accept EU environ-
mental-protection regulations and inte-
grate them into its legal system. At the 
time, this requirement did not involve 
aspects drawing attention to the fact that 
implementation of the regulations in 
question could be obstructed by institu-
tional deficiencies or lack of funds.  
Over the next 15 years, however, 
the EU position on newly acceding coun-
tries completely changed. The environ-
mental problems of Eastern Europe rep-
resented a bigger challenge than previous 
enlargements had done. First, the state of 
the environment was far worse. Secondly, 
the number of environmental-protection 
laws had swollen in the meantime to 
300. Thirdly, it had become clear that if 
the details of the environmental-protection 
chapter of accession were not duly 
drawn up, significant subsequent costs 
could be incurred by the EU. The EU 
also recognized that the administrative 
structures of environmental protection in 
the acceding countries required reinforc-
ing.  
Compared with earlier enlargements, 
there was a major difference in that the 
environmental projects of the EU’s pre-
accession aid programmes (PHARE, ISPA) 
were instructive to Central and Eastern 
Europe in terms of how successfully the 
supported countries managed to use the 
earmarked financial aid. Moreover, the 
EU had recognized by then that the pace 
of environmental integration was set 
largely by the slowest, most reluctant 
country.  
Due to these developments, the EU 
produced a threefold set of requirements 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Applicant 
countries had to satisfy (a) legal re-
quirements of environmental protection, 
and find answers to (b) institutional and 
(c) financial challenges. The integration 
strategy went far beyond requiring the 
formal transfer of rules of law. A sig-
nificant amount of energy was invested 
in elaborating institution-building and fi-
nancial measures, to avoid what was de-
scribed as an ‘implementation deficit’.  
So the policy of adaptation goes far 
beyond legal harmonization. Attention has 
to be given in acceding countries to so-
cial interests and conflicts that influence 
decision-making. The different pasts and 
political structures of the acceding coun-
tries obliged the EU to change its meth-
ods and the nature of its institutions 
(Fiala 2001). 
Europeanization: methods and     
institutions rather than               
in objectives and style 
One case study examined the quality and 
quantity of the impact of the EU on the 
environmental policy of member-states, 
and the mechanisms through which that 
impact was made (Liefferink and Jordan 
2002). The authors defined the Europe-
anization process simply as the impact of 
European integration on policy-making 
processes and policies of member-states. 
They also examined whether it was pos-
sible to describe this process over dec-
ades as convergence, so that member-
states could be said to be proceeding in 
the same direction in environmental pol-
icy. Another question was whether these 
changes showed general trends valid for 
all member-states. The counterhypothesis 
proposed that the top-down impact from 





Research into Europeanization here, and 
in the case of adaptation of all other 
actual policy areas, is hindered by a 
general paradox in impact assessment 
(Liefferink and Jordan 2002; Goetz 
2000). Europeanization research is a 
search for the effect (impact) belonging 
to a cause, but once the impact becomes 
clear in some detail, several similarly 
probable competitors appear around the 
original cause, all with some rightful 
claim to be the cause of the impact ob-
served. Applying the paradox to EU inte-
gration, therefore, if convergence does 
occur, how can it be proved that it was 
caused by Europeanization? 
Environmental policy is the EU’s 
most developed area of competence. It 
has covered in the last 30 years an ever-
greater number of topics and policy ar-
eas related to the environment. At the 
start of the integration process, most 
member-states already had variously de-
veloped environmental policies, so that 
the convergence or want of it was dis-
cernible to researchers.  
The research covered ten member-
states: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. In 
each, a national study was made, outlin-
ing the effectiveness of EU environmental 
policy. The results were as follows.  
* With the objectives of environmental 
policy, it was shown that acceptance 
of modern environmental-protection 
principles – for example, eliminating 
the cause of pollution rather than just 
reducing it – was faster and more 
obvious in EU member-states that had 
shown a more progressive orientation 
towards environmental protection from 
the outset. This placed something of a 
question mark over the intensity of the 
EU-specific impact.  
* The impact of the EU was more dis-
cernible in methods of environmental 
policy. For example, stronger conver-
gence could be seen in methods of 
measuring emissions and various envi-
ronmental procedures (impact assess-
ments, access to environmental infor-
mation or environmental management) 
than in objectives. Furthermore, envi-
ronmental standards for numerous 
products and technologies were unified 
through directives. 
* With the institutional structure of pol-
icy, the strongest convergence was 
seen in national institutions with work-
ing relations with central EU organiza-
tions. These are mainly central imple-
menting organizations, such as envi-
ronment ministries, whose units re-
sponsible for EU adaptation have been 
strengthened by the Europeanization 
process. While several member-states 
took steps towards regional decentrali-
zation of environmental policy-making, 
the obligation to apply Community as-
pects began an unavoidable centraliza-
tion process. Simultaneously, legal 
harmonization reduced the influence of 
national parliaments on environmental 
lawmaking. The EU broadened the 
chances for NGOs, which used Brus-
sels as a lever for their policies. The 
EU also intervened in the conciliation 
and coordination policy of some states 
in relation to environmental protection, 
although it did not really question the 
traditional bargaining process behind 
regulations.  
* The style of national environmental 
policy was not greatly influenced by 
European integration. Countries where 
environmental policy had been 
‘greener’ or more preventive in nature 
retained these attributes.  
Thus convergence mechanisms 
largely affected the policy content, in 
particular through the harmonization 
mechanism, while imitation, penetration 
and the example of elite networks 
worked less well (Liefferink and Jordan 
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2002). The impact of the EU ‘inter-
weaves’ national environmental policies 
with its own blue and yellow threads, 
mainly through its influence on stan-
dards, ministries, parliaments and the 
status of NGOs. Moreover, it ironed out 
‘creases’ that arose after the inception of 
modern environmental policies in the 
1960s. For example, exclusive use of cer-
tain implementation methods was aban-
doned; the range of private and regional 
actors involved in conciliation was ex-
panded. Thus the EU has not changed 
essentially either the fundamental content 
or the fabric of member-states’ environ-
mental policies. The environmental policies 
have not converged on a single model. It 
is likely that if convergence mechanisms 
do not change, acceding countries will 
not perceive the changes as being put in 
a European straitjacket. Indeed, alongside 
the phenomena of Europeanization, envi-
ronmental solutions and approaches of 
one or other acceding country may even 
spread in the old member-states. 
IMPACT MECHANISMS              
FOR CLOSING THE GAP               
IN HUNGARY 
The next two sections examine how the 
learning process that has taken place in 
EU environmental policy has impinged in 
Hungary on one of most sensitive policy 
areas of environmental protection: waste 
management. Attention focuses on the 
following issues: 
* How does Europeanization affect Hun-
garian environmental policy? Through 
which institutions and which of their 
networks does it spread? How and 
through which mechanisms is it en-
forced and what sort of institutional 
learning processes does it induce?  
* How multi-levelled is Hungarian envi-
ronmental governance, and what im-
pact has EU adaptation had on it?  
* Which form of EU adaptation has 
succeeded best: imitation, harmoniza-
tion or penetration? And in what 
sense is it possible to talk of conver-
gence?  
* Which attributes of governance have 
been most affected by EU adaptation: 
objectives, methods, institutions or style 
of governance? 
Harmonization of the legal system 
Legal harmonization is the most formal, 
classical mechanism for adapting to the 
EU. It brings the legal instruments of the 
public policy in question into line with 
the acquis. 
Hungary undertook to adjust its 
ecological policy and laws to EU stan-
dards when preparing in the early 1990s 
for its Treaty of Association to come into 
force. There has been continual Hungar-
ian–EU cooperation over environmental 
protection for the last decade, with the 
EU annual country reports noticing vary-
ing success, but the regulations have 
been harmonized down to the details and 
regulations covering the main EU stan-
dards built into the legal system. The 
cornerstones are: 
* Act LIII/1995 on environmental protec-
tion contains the general regulations in 
a comprehensive system of require-
ments. It also provides the economic 
tools and clarifies the obligations of 
the various major actors.  
* The National Environmental Protection 
Programme of 1997–2002 followed 
from Parliamentary Motion No. 
83/1997. It took into consideration the 
EU enlargement document for Central 
and Eastern Europe, the EU Fifth Ac-
tion Programme, and the plan of ac-
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tion for the environment entitled 
Agenda 21.  
* The Government Programme for 1998–
2000 introduced the legal-
harmonization agenda designed to 
bring Hungarian environmental law 
into full conformity with EU legislation 
by 2002. The National Programme for 
Acceptance of the Acquis Communau-
taire defined objectives, deadlines for 
legal harmonization, and requirements 
for institution building and implemen-
tation, as well as assessing the costs 
of harmonization and detailing the fi-
nancial sources for these within the 
central budget, the private sector and 
the local authorities.  
* Act XLIII/2000 on waste management 
was already in harmony with the EU 
Waste Framework Directive No. 
75/442. Together with the ministry 
orders for implementation, it clarifies 
the rights and obligations of all types 
of actors in waste management. The 
act gave the Ministry of the Environ-
ment greater responsibility in relation 
to communal waste, which had previ-
ously been the responsibility of local 
government organizations (LGOs) and 
certain regional administrative bodies 
regulating construction. The act re-
placed a previous incomplete and out-
moded set of waste-management 
regulations. 
* The environmental chapter of the ac-
cession negotiations between the EU 
and Hungary was agreed in June 
2001. According to estimates, the 
harmonization costs of this chapter 
alone came to HUF 2500 billion 
(about 10 billion Euros). Hungary was 
granted derogation for only four EU 
regulations. The EU now inspects the 
range, content and quality of imple-
mentation of the harmonized environ-
mental-protection regulations. Where 
there is a failure to conform, the 
European Supreme Court is entitled to 
impose a penalty on the Hungarian 
government. Of the derogations, two 
concern waste management: targets for 
waste incineration and the recycling of 
packaging materials did not have to 
be met by the time of Hungary’s ac-
cession. 
The results of legal harmonization 
so far have been significant. By 2002, 
most EU legislation and standards relat-
ing to environmental protection had been 
adopted. Environmental policies are 
mainly grounded on the use of economic 
regulation and market-compatible tools, 
and realization of these has been accom-
panied by a large number of environ-
ment-oriented projects. At the same time, 
most problems incurred have arisen from 
lack of coordination between institutions 
in different policy areas and uneven 
speeds of adaptation among government 
organizations. The adaptation process is 
slowed because the system of lower-level 
implementation decrees has been divided 
between competent ministries without 
adequate harmonization and numerous 
local-government orders for implementing 
them are still lacking. 
Applying the law and building 
institutions 
To ensure the law is applied, the institu-
tional capacity and organizational culture 
need developing. Applying the law – im-
plementation and enforcement of envi-
ronmental regulations, and the precondi-
tion of improving the institutional system 
of environmental protection – poses the 
biggest challenge in Europeanizing envi-
ronmental protection. Modern enforce-
ment is hindered by inconsistent political 
decisions, lack of resources and informa-
tion, and deficiencies in political culture 
and environmental awareness.  
Hungarian policy on environmental 
protection and nature conservancy were 
given their own ministry in April 1988. 
The government that took office in 2002 
put them with water management. Insti-
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tutional decentralization in waste man-
agement came about with the change of 
political system in 1989–90, so that the 
impact of EU integration cannot be 
shown directly. The environmental-
protection agencies are in fact units su-
pervised closely by the ministry.  
The integration process has meant 
implementing EU legislation on environ-
mental protection and meeting greater 
demands for medium-level institutional 
structures. Several central-government 
tasks and responsibilities have been trans-
ferred from national to local government 
or to regional and local levels of decen-
tralized government agencies. Such or-
ganizations, however, have limited re-
sources and expertise.  
Modernizing the institutional struc-
ture of environmental protection was the 
aim of numerous PHARE projects. Many 
institution-building programmes aimed to 
facilitate the introduction of EU environ-
mental legislation and transfer member-
states’ experiences to Hungary. The first 
wave of these started in 1988–9, when 
experts delegated by the EU prepared 
feasibility studies and made IT and or-
ganizational-development proposals. Later 
the support shifted increasingly to financ-
ing investments, until at the end of the 
1990s, the investment programmes gave 
way to the so-called twinning pro-
grammes within the PHARE framework, 
with EU experts from other national en-
vironmental-protection agencies involved 
in implementing projects in Hungary. 
Waste-management planning 
This is among the most important coor-
dination mechanisms of multi-level gov-
ernance. While plans are prepared, in-
formal bargaining occurs between public 
administration levels, economic interest 
groups and the civil sector. Plan prepa-
ration is an element of key importance, 
prescribed by EU law and adopted in 
Hungarian environmental policy.  
The National Waste Management 
Plan was endorsed by Parliament in 
2002. Drafting had been preceded by a 
broad process of interest reconciliation. 
Among the targets is to be recycling half 
the packaging materials by 2005 and 
having landfills only accepting waste that 
cannot be recycled or incinerated after 
2008. Implementation between 2002 and 
2008 will cost HUF 360 billion (1.4 bil-
lion Euros), of which the government in-
tends to finance one third from EU ISPA 
funds.  
The work is hierarchically organ-
ized. Regional, county and local waste-
management plans, compulsory or rec-
ommended, will follow, influencing deci-
sions by administrative bodies and pro-
vide a basis for implementing projects, so 
that their impact extends to all waste 
producers and bodies dealing with waste 
collection, elimination and utilization. Pro-
jects that fail to conform to the plans 
cannot be financed from environmental 
funds. The planning, to be done mainly 
by the environmental-protection appara-
tus, brings new, unaccustomed assign-
ments involving a series of interest-
reconciliation measures and management 
moves rather than the usual work of 
administration. 
EU-backed programmes for 
waste-management infrastructure  
The objectives and means of programmes 
co-financed by the EU have been so de-
fined as to induce cooperation between 
groups in the public, private and civil 
sectors. They can only be realized 
through public-private partnership (PPP) 
– an alliance of LGOs in neighbouring 
communities with private waste-treatment 
firms.  
The EU supports the process of 
complying with Hungary’s obligations as 
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an EU member. Jointly with Hungarian 
government, it co-finances major projects 
for modernizing the environmental-
protection infrastructure and ensures fi-
nancial and professional resources for 
implementing legal harmonization and 
changing environmental policy. A number 
of waste-management projects have al-
ready been co-financed by EU grants. 
Efficient and transparent institutional 
conditions for Community financing of 
environmental investments were created 
in the 1990s, including a system of insti-
tutions to receive moneys from EU pre-
accession funds. In the early years after 
1989–90, most EU support came from 
the PHARE programme, which supported 
many environmental projects. This pro-
gramme has gradually given way to the 
ISPA and SAPARD pre-accession pro-
grammes, with almost half the resources 
of the former devoted to protecting the 
environment.  
 Although the support programmes 
help finance new investments, the annual 
operating costs of the infrastructure cre-
ated has to be paid by LGOs and private 
business partners. Thus they often pro-
duce either contractually based proprie-
tary cooperation schemes between benefi-
ciary LGOs or PPPs involving the infra-
structure-owning LGOs and the infra-
structure-operating private companies.  
Coordination problems and lack of 
local funds mean that a relatively long 
period is spent on organizing and plan-
ning projects, rather than actual con-
struction. Another problem is that force-
ful lobbies of local and sectoral interest 
groups may ensure questionable priorities 
among environmental projects, leading to 
lower environmental benefit. 
Under the ISPA programme, the EU 
planned in 2000–2003 to support the 
development of 12 integrated waste-
management systems across Hungary. In 
fact, six such projects were underway by 
2002, each able to take the waste from 
several dozen communities.1 The pro-
                                                 
1 Two of these sub-regional projects lie in the 
grammes typically involve building re-
gionally scattered waste-management in-
frastructures (waste collection, compost-
ing, selection and transport capacities), 
centred on the development of a high-
capacity, modern, central landfill. 
MULTI-LEVEL WASTE-
MANAGEMENT GOVERNANCE      
IN HUNGARY  
 
Conciliation between regional     
levels of public administration 
Formulating regulations for waste man-
agement is the duty of central govern-
ment, in agreement with EU institutions. 
Lower levels of public administration and 
regional development may take part in 
pre-regulation bargaining, but receive a 
more significant role in the sharing of 
funds, implementation of legislation, and 
enforcement of the law.  
Regions, as official bodies, are 
among the least significant actors in 
regulating the waste-management market, 
but they influence the sharing of funds 
from the EU and Hungarian central 
budget, so that they can have a big im-
pact on infrastructural investment deci-
sions. Their key development documents 
– regional strategic plans – usually con-
sider waste-management aspects and in-
clude complex waste-management pro-
grammes to provide for regional landfills, 
waste-recycling programmes, recultivation 
of filled, uncontrolled landfills, and iden-
tifying and halting illegal dumping sites.  
                                                                          
Central Hungary region examined in detail below. 
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The counties’ waste-management 
role has gradually decreased, although 
effective legislation has given them an 
obligation to take part in waste-
management development and meeting 
environmental aspects within the county. 
County authorities can also prepare a 
waste-treatment plan, but this is not 
compulsory. If they do, they have to co-
ordinate local waste-management plans, 
promote demarcation of the joint waste-
treatment areas of LGOs, and cooperate 
with other county authorities in imple-
menting waste-management tasks. 
Budapest forms a special unit. The 
capital produces the highest per capita 
quantity of waste in the country. Buda-
pest’s landfills lie in the conurbation, so 
that there is a significant flow of waste 
from centre to periphery. Incineration of 
solid waste creates conflicts between the 
capital and the rest of the conurbation. 
The capital contains the country’s largest 
waste incinerator, owned by the munici-
pality, but prevailing winds spread pollu-
tion from it to neighbouring communities. 
Pressure of litigation by these communi-
ties contributes to producing an envi-
ronment-friendly solution to the waste 
incinerator (more effective off-gas filters). 
The Mayor’s Office of Budapest is at 
once the owner and the biggest client of 
Hungary’s largest waste-management 
firm, FKF Rt.  
LGOs have to shoulder the biggest 
responsibility for locating communal solid 
waste produced in the community. They 
provide waste-management services, either 
through a self-owned municipal public-
service company, or through a private or 
mixed-ownership firm. Waste manage-
ment is one of many policy areas where 
the obligations of LGOs do not corre-
spond with the funds available to them. 
The Waste Management Act (2000) and 
National Waste Management Plan (2002) 
made this even more obvious by pre-
scribing that all landfills lacking modern 
sealing had to be closed, so compelling 
LGOs to handle organic solid waste sepa-
rately and check compliance at locally 
owned landfills. In practice, the LGOs 
ignore these regulations and the govern-
ment has no means of intervening to en-
courage compliance. LGO associations of-
ten voice protests at central government 
failure to provide them with funds com-
mensurate to their obligations. 
Conciliation with                   
economic-interest groups 
Stress has increasingly been laid in Hun-
gary since the mid-1990s on cooperation 
between the private sector and the gov-
ernment during legal harmonization. In 
drafting legislation, government environ-
mental-protection bodies have developed 
the practice of social conciliation, 
whereby interested parties are usually 
questioned separately. Experience shows 
that this ensures that a more useful set 
of principles is obtained from actors than 
would be the case if all those concerned 
were represented round the table at 
once.  
Introduction of regulations relating 
to waste and waste-management plans is 
always preceded by conciliation and a 
bargaining process. Governmental bodies 
send out draft plans to a list of those 
affected: interest-representing organiza-
tions, trade unions and chambers of 
commerce. These supply facts and opin-
ions and are invited to ministerial or in-
ter-ministerial forums. The form of coop-
eration with governmental bodies is often 
impact assessment prepared by profes-
sional organizations. Interest groups such 
as the Confederation of Hungarian Em-
ployers and Industrialists have set up 
working committees and specialist net-
works of corporate experts. Over several 
years, the concept of the Waste Man-
agement Act and National Waste Man-
agement Plan was negotiated and agreed, 
with conferences and other forums play-
ing a role. 
  
17
However, the chance for firms to 
assert their interests went further. In 
practice, if they cannot be reconciled to 
an official decision, they routinely turn to 
political intermediaries: members of Par-
liament and political decision-makers such 
as state secretaries. Within the economic-
interest groups, waste-management and 
waste-treatment firms form a distinct 
group from the viewpoint of waste man-
agement. If smaller and specialist compa-
nies are also considered, there are over 
1400 firms in Hungary dealing with 
waste collection, deposition, utilization, 
transport, and processing or treating 
hazardous waste. Some of these service 
providers are privately owned, the larger 
ones usually being foreign-owned, while 
the rest consist of waste-treatment firms 
in partial or full public ownership, 
closely connected to their client LGOs.  
The association of publicly owned 
waste-management companies dates back 
some decades. Privately owned waste-
utilization and treatment firms have 
formed trade associations recently. These 
lobby intensively at various government 
and local-government levels, in areas 
such as regulation, choice of public and 
private investment strategies, and applica-
tion of funds from domestic, foreign, 
private and central budgetary sources.  
There is lively competition between 
landfills, with operators and owners of 
facilities (including LGOs) competing for 
waste produced in a specific area, to 
achieve cost efficiency for the landfill. So, 
due to distinctive features of regulation 
and the waste-management market in 
Hungary, the NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) 
syndrome has been joined by a PIMBY 
(put-in-my-backyard) stance in some re-
spects.  
Private waste-treatment companies 
are keen for further liberalization of the 
waste-management services market and 
freer competition in local markets, where 
municipally owned firms still hold a mo-
nopoly. A few privately owned waste-
management firms see themselves as los-
ers by EU integration, as the EU-financed 
waste management programmes, as these 
programmes give their publicly owned 
rivals an advantage. Another competitive 
disadvantage is that the publicly owned 
companies are much closer to the mana-
gerial and investment decisions of their 
main clients, the LGOs.  
One requirement for Europeanizing 
waste management is for the several 
thousand landfills now in Hungary to be 
reduced to a tenth the present number, 
which will have to conform with the 
strict criteria. The number, capacity and 
optimal locations of these landfills are 
still being debated. The debate is typically 
between companies already possessing a 
landfill and LGOs with no such a facility 
of their own. Opinions are strongly influ-
enced by the amount of investment al-
ready made by those concerned. 
Conciliation with the public          
and civil organizations 
An institutional system of public hearings 
and other forums designed to give the 
public a say has been developing gradu-
ally since the mid-1990s. Numerous laws 
adopted after the EU pattern prescribe 
public involvement in the decision-making 
process. This applies to acts on environ-
mental-impact assessment or on preven-
tion of integrated pollution. PHARE or ISPA 
support for an environmental project also 
depends on public opinion being can-
vassed by beneficiary organizations and 
the results of this being documented. Lo-
cal communities often use these opportu-
nities and occasionally obstruct planned 
investment, but in many cases, public 
consultation is merely a formality.  
During such conciliation, decision-
makers regularly listen to the views of 
environmental-protection NGOs, despite 
widespread beliefs that their opinions of-
ten exaggerate the possibilities for prohi-
bition and enforcement and fail to con-
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sider economic tools or economic conse-
quences. Contacts between the environ-
mental administration and the green 
movements are not regular enough, al-
though the framework was created long 
ago. The green movements are hampered 
by financial and legal problems and a 
shortage of volunteers. LGOs fail to iden-
tify environmental tasks that could be 
assigned to local civil movements, al-
though it has to be admitted that the 
latter would often be incapable of per-
forming them. On the other hand, most 
local civil movements are typically more 
prepared for European regulation than 
their regionally competent LGOs. 
CASE STUDY: THE CENTRAL 
HUNGARY REGION 
Besides reviewing the Europeanization 
process in Hungarian waste management, 
the research analysed the behaviour of 
various main actors in the process and 
mapped their networks of relations, in a 
regional survey using in-depth interviews 
and questionnaires. 
Survey of actors                    
in waste-management policy  
Structured interviews were made with 
representatives of 32 institutional actors 
in waste management in the Central 
Hungary region, as well as public institu-
tions, firms and civil organizations. 
Where necessary, several respondents 
were sought at the same institution. 
The interviews covered:  
* The organization’s network of relations 
with other organizations and institu-
tions, 
* The appearance of EU integration 
mechanisms in the organization and 
the impacts of these on the network, 
and 
* The processes of adaptation and learn-
ing in the organization. 
With the sample interviewed at in-
stitutions, firms and organizations, it was 
important for every major type of stake-
holder to be represented, including gov-
ernment and local-government institutions 
and actors in the private and civil sec-
tors of waste management in the Central 
Hungary region. The actors were classi-
fied as follows: 
* About half of the institutions ques-
tioned are central, regional, sub-
regional, capital-city or local admini-
stration, with emphasis on the envi-
ronmental administration. The sample 
contained a territorially representative 
sample of LGOs in the region.  
* A high proportion of the organizations 
questioned are from the private sector. 
The respondents included a representa-
tive sample by activity of the region’s 
active waste-management companies 
and their alliances. Besides these, there 
were mainly firms providing waste-
treatment services, mostly on behalf of 
LGOs. The larger waste-treatment 
companies are usually owned by lar-
ger communities or by foreign owners 
through the Hungarian subsidiary of a 
holding company in an EU member-
state.  
* Some other organizations questioned 
belong to the civil sector: environ-
mental protection groups dealing with 
waste-management issues. 
The regional environmental           
situation  
Central Hungary consists of Budapest, 
with a population of 1.8 million, and 
surrounding Pest County, with a popula-
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tion of 1 million. The region illustrates 
well a centre-periphery relation as re-
gards environmental issues. The region is 
relatively small, densely populated and 
centralized compared with Hungary’s 
other six regions. It differs also inasmuch 
as the conflicts between actors appear to 
be sharper here than elsewhere. The 
capital produces a large amount of 
waste, but does not have an area within 
its borders suitable for depositing it. It 
therefore cooperates with communities in 
the conurbation, using their waste-
depositing facilities. This and other inter-
actions in waste management in the re-
gion demonstrate well the mutual de-
pendence of Budapest and its surround-
ings. 
The general state of the environ-
ment in Budapest has become a bottle-
neck in urban development. The most 
acute problems are air pollution and 
sewage disposal, followed by insufficient 
green space in overcrowded inner-city 
districts. The surrounding, densely popu-
lated conurbation has an agricultural-
cum-industrial character. Moving away 
from the conurbation into rural areas, 
the state of the environment depends 
mainly on whether there is heavy indus-
try, a dense transport network or agri-
culture in the district, or whether signifi-
cant natural resources dominate there. 
The features of the system of pro-
duction and collection of communal solid 
waste is characterized by the following 
facts in the case 
study region:  
* In Budapest, the 
quantity of solid 
communal waste 
collected as a 
public service is 
about 4 million 
m3 a year. The 
population of the 
city decreased by 
about 10 per 
cent in the 
1990s, which 
also reduced the 
quantity of waste 
generated. The 
collection of 
waste is almost 







ing 60 per cent 
of the solid 
communal waste 
collected in the 
city. At the be-
ginning of the 
1990s, four 
Table 1
The survey interviews 
 
Type Organizations 
Government institutions Ministry of Environmental Protection and Water 
Management (ISPA and Waste Management de-
partment, Budapest), Central Danube Region En-
vironmental Protection Agency (Budapest). 




‘Pro Regio’ Agency: Central Hungary Develop-




South Buda District Regional Development Local 
Government Association (Budakeszi); Zsámért –
Zsámbék Basin Regional Development Association 
(Biatorbágy). 
LGOs Aszód, Budapest Municipality Public Utility De-
partment (Budapest), Budakeszi, Csömör, Gödöllő, 
Pusztazámor, Solymár, Zsámbék. 
Waste-management 
firms 
FKF Rt., Budapest Municipal Waste Company 
(Budapest); Ökoviz Kft. (Cegléd), VÜSZI Kft. 
(Gödöllő), Ceszolg Kft. (Cegléd), ASA Hungary 
Kft. (Gyál), Biofilter Kft. (Budaörs), Doppstadt 
Kft. (Zsámbék), Ereco Co. (Budapest), Pyrus-
Rumpold Kft. (Budapest and Aszód), Becker Kft. 
(Érd), Mózes Kft. (Cegléd), Selective Waste Utili-
zation Kft. (Tura), Rumpold Bicske Kft. (Bicske). 
Trade associations and 
representatives of busi-
ness interests 
Association of Private Communal Waste Man-
agement Companies (Budapest), Public Hygiene 
Society (Gárdony), National Association of Waste 
Utilizers (Budapest), Confederation of Hungarian 




Humus Waste Partnership (Budapest), Zsámbék 




in the capital but 
these became full 
and were closed 
down. Since then, 
the rest of the 
communal waste 
has been deposited 
in landfills in sur-
rounding Pest 
County.  
* Pest County pro-
duces an annual 
quantity of 1.7 mil-
lion m3 of solid 
communal waste, 
which increased 
during the 1990s. 
Organized collec-
tion is developing 
rapidly in the 
county, but cover-
age is still not full. 
Turning to in-
dustrial waste in the 
region:  
* Companies are 
obliged to report 
the production of 
hazardous wastes, so that there is ac-
cessible data about this. Production of 
hazardous waste fell significantly be-
tween 1993 and 1997 in Budapest 
(from 600,000 to 200,000 tonnes per 
annum) and in Pest County (from 
400,000 tonnes/year to 75,000 ton-
nes/year). 2 
* The quantity of non-hazardous indus-
trial waste can be estimated at 
1,660,000 tonnes per annum in Buda-
pest and 780,000 in Pest County. 
                                                 
2 Category changes also played a role in the big 
reduction. 
THE SOCIAL NETWORK  
Respondents were asked to give detailed 
accounts of their social networks. One 
important criterion for success in waste-
management policy is cooperation of a 
wide range of actors in implementing it. 
Here again, the harmonized action of 
autonomous actors is important to envi-
ronmental performance and appears to 
be the only viable behaviour pattern for 
the future. A good example is that only 
pressure on LGOs to cooperate in this 
manner can produce economic plant sizes 
for waste-management investments.  
Table 2





tion in Budapest. Im-




Complex, significant pollution arising from the 
city’s role as a capital and its central role in 
the transport infrastructure (Budapest and con-
urbation). 
Lack of selective waste collection (region). 
Region typified by continual illegal dumping of 
waste at uncontrolled sites and a high number 
of illegal dumps (Pest County). 
Many legally operated landfills do not meet ba-
sic public-health requirements (region). 
Problem of special waste (e.g. car batteries, bat-
teries) partially unsolved (region). 
Tight LGO budgets hinder enforcement of sev-
eral environmental criteria (region). 
Poor awareness of environment (region). 
Opportunities Threats 













Illegal waste dumps pose a health hazard. 
Illegal practice of dumping sewage sludge in 
landfills maintained for solid waste. 
Air-pollution impacts of waste incineration cause 
conflicts between LGOs. (Affected districts and 
communities in the conurbation are suing the 
municipality of Budapest). 
Conflicts between LGOs over underused landfills 
that became obsolete due to competitive invest-
ments in nearby communities (various sub-
regions). 
Conflicts outside Pest County over waste coming 
to its landfills. 
Source: compiled by authors based on interviews made during the ADAPT re-
search, also using Közép-Magyarországi 2001 and Pest Megye 2001. 
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The research assessed the networks 
that arose during administrative and 
market coordination: long-term relations 
of ownership and subcontracting and re-
lations between service providers and 
customers. Projects initiated jointly by 
stakeholders for a fixed period were also 
considered, as some of them created 
more or less regular, occasional, formal 
and informal relations between investi-
gated stakeholders. The raw relational 
data from the interviews was quantita-
tively assessed and processed by standard 
Social Network Analysis methods using 
UCINET 6.0 software. 
Cardinal features of the social net-
work created by waste-management ac-
tors in the Central Hungary region were 
revealed. The quantitative analysis showed 
that most relations fell into two groups: 
* those interpretable within the market, 
supply and demand paradigm – the 
most typical demand-side actors were 
regional LGOs, while those on the 
supply side were waste-management 
service providers, and  
* bureaucratic relationships such as 
those between environmental-protection 
agencies and all other actors subject 
to the regulations.  
One interesting finding was that the 
network centred on rich relations be-
tween the main supply and demand ac-
tors: ownership, regulation or customer 
relations had reinforcing or balancing 
effects. One such is the capital’s waste-
management company. By comparison, 
there are smaller LGOs or waste-
management companies on the periphery 
of the network that are confined to a 
simple, clear-cut role on the demand or 
supply side of waste-management services 
and typically develop a poorer network 
of relations.  
Further characteristics of the net-
work are the following. 
Density 
The density shows how rich or poor the 
actors’ network is. As expected, the den-
sity of relations differs the groups of 
waste-management. The most dense is the 
sub-network comprising government-
sector institutions, publicly owned waste-
treatment companies and their trade as-
sociations, and the largest privately 
owned waste-treatment companies with 
their numerous subsidiaries, and cus-
tomer and subcontractor relations.  
Centrality 
Centrality indicators are intended to re-
veal how deeply an actor is embedded in 
the network and how centralized the 
network is, i.e. how dominant a role its 
centre and sub-centres play. Asymmetric 
relations are typical of waste-management 
networks in the region. Actors in the 
centre of the network, such as the Min-
istry of the Environment and the region’s 
Environmental Protection Agency, were 
mentioned by name by many respon-
dents, while these institutions themselves 
only highlighted their most important 
administrative relations. On the other 
hand, local actors mentioned relations of 
a broader range, compared with how 
frequently they were mentioned by others. 
The network of relations shows that 
landfills of sub-regional or regional at-
traction are a scarce resource. Their op-
erators and private and public owners 
are embedded more deeply in the waste-
management network, and these organi-
zations have a more central role in the 
regional waste-management market than 
other communities or companies without 





The aim of the 
structural-
equivalence calcula-
tion is to reveal 
groups of similar 
structure among the 
actors as regards 





the following four 
groups: (1) Actors 
with strong relations 
account for half the 
sample. The density 
of relations within 
this group was 
about twice that of 
relations within or 
between any other 
blocks. The mem-




capital city and a 
few communities 
and companies with 
easy access to sub-
regional landfills. 
(2) The second 
group contains the 
bulk of waste-
management com-
panies. Their webs 
of relations within 
the sample are rela-
tively poor. They 
are strongly con-
nected to their cli-
ent communities, 
but relations be-
tween them are 
weak, which can be 
Table 3
Conflicts and tensions between waste-management actors 
 
Causes and their EU aspects Ensuing conflicts and tensions 
Conflict over resources on macro level: 
implementation of EU environmental di-
rectives costs over 10 per cent of Hun-
gary’s GDP.  
EU harmonization of environ-
mental-protection legislation, 
growing complexity of environ-
mental tasks. 
Conflict over resources in applying the 
law: mounting tasks strain manpower 
and expertise of environmental agencies. 
Government and EU co-finance 
landfills and other waste-
management infrastructure under 
the ISPA programme, whose bene-
ficiaries are public institutions. 
Conflicts of a not-in-my-backyard and 
put-in-my-backyard nature over waste 
depositing, between LGOs and between 
civil organizations and waste-management 
firms. Procedural conflicts due to un-
regulated PPP. Publicly funded infrastruc-
ture creates competition for landfills set 
up purely with private investment. Com-
petitive conflicts between privately and 
publicly owned service providers for lo-
cal-government market and investment 
funds.  
EU only supports waste-
management systems of regional 
significance.  
Trends towards centralizing waste 
management are typical. Landfills become 
ever larger, and a mounting quantity of 
waste is transported between communi-
ties. This reorganizes the spatial structure 
of waste flows and creates new depend-
ency between communities.  
Continuing debate on optimal 
treatment of waste, influenced by 
EU regulations (incineration, land-
fills, recycling, etc.)  
Trade and local groups with opposing 
interests develop, e.g. conflicts between 
communities over pollution caused by 
waste incineration carried by prevailing 
winds.  
Illegal dumping in public areas: 
one sign of weak implementation 
of harmonized EU regulations. 
Conflicts between environmental agencies 
and LGOs on the one hand and house-
holds and firms on the other.  
Most legal landfills fail to satisfy 
EU environmental, technical and 
health requirements. Continued 
use is a sign of weak implemen-
tation of EU regulations. 
Conflicts between landfill owners and op-
erators (mainly LGOs) on the one hand 
and environmental agencies on the other. 
LGOs shift responsibility for com-
munal waste management to pri-
vate and semi-private (municipally 
owned) firms. Publicly owned 
landfills usually run by PPPs for 
financial reasons, but EU also 
backs such arrangements. 
Disputes related to procedural rules, 
conflicts over contractual conditions, 
waste fees and collection methods. 
Schedule for solving various envi-
ronmental tasks (e.g. sewage 
treatment, waste management) 
depends on local conditions, but 
EU obligations and resources also 
affect priorities. 
Conflicts between groups of various busi-
ness interests that influence public deci-
sions. 
Selective waste collection a legal-
harmonization obligation, but only 
profitable for some types of waste 
(metals, paper). 
Conflicts between LGOs, with-profit ser-
vice providers and environmental associa-




explained by fierce competition in the 
market for waste-management services. 
(3) The third group consists of important 
regional public actors, such as the im-
plementation body of the Regional Devel-
opment Council and Pest County, as well 
as the trade association of publicly 
owned waste-management companies. (4) 
The fourth group only includes LGOs 
and their sub-regional associations. They 
only connect horizontally if they are 
neighbours or use a landfill owned by 
another LGO, or belong to the same sub-
regional association. However, their verti-
cal connections with the third group – 
county and regional organs – are strong.  
This analysis reveals a notable cir-
cumstance. Within the region, the capi-
tal’s institutions belong to the first group, 
with the most dense network, where or-
gans with national influence can also be 
found, while the system of relations for 
institutions representing the region and 
county differs enough to form a separate 
group. While the capital city depends 
strongly on surrounding areas for the 
physical processes of waste management, 
the institutional network of waste man-
agement shows a very different picture. 
The capital and the few communities and 
waste-management firms involved in the 
capital’s service are distinct from the in-
stitutions, LGOs and firms in the region’s 
remaining areas.  
A lack or undeveloped nature of 
relations is often found because the civil 
culture in Hungary concerning the envi-
ronment is relatively undeveloped and 
cannot be compared with the environ-
mentally aware behaviour found in 
Western Europe. The amount of illegally 
dumped waste is very high in Hungary, 
which is a reliable indicator of deficien-
cies in social capital, i.e. in willingness to 
cooperate, and in the level of public con-
sciousness. Compared with the infrastruc-
tural investments made in Hungary with 
EU co-financing, PR campaigns on any 
waste-management topic, including selec-
tive waste collection or fights against ille-
gal dumps, could be made significantly 
more cheaply. Yet here, there is a 
marked lag, a disadvantage that has not 
been eroded by EU aid programmes ei-
ther.  
Waste-management policy is marked 
by conflict and competition between ac-
tors, not just cooperation. Europeaniza-
tion has restructured conflicts and the 
mechanisms for resolving them in waste 
management. The Central Hungary re-
gion, especially Budapest, differs from 
other regions in having sharper inter-
communal and inter-sectoral conflicts in 
this field. Some are of a market-
protection nature. Opening the country’s 
borders was not immediately followed by 
free flows of so-called green-list (non-
hazardous) waste. For instance, entrepre-
neurs’ worries about the impact of iron-
waste exports on raw materials supply 
for Hungarian steel production were 
heard by the governmental administra-
tion, and consequent measures have cre-
ated substantial business for metal-
recycling companies. 
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